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THE

CLEAR

AND

PRESENT
BY

KARL D.

DANGER

DOCTRINE

LYON

utterances that aptly and
Like so many judicial
dramatically express a thought, the phrase'clear and
present danger' has become a bon mot, used over and over
Inartificially, the
by judges and the public alike.
idea that freedom of speech must not be curbed unless
a clear and present danger so demands has been hailed
But to
doctrine.
as a basic American constitutional
find out how it is actually useful as a legal principle
in deciding a case, we go to the United States Supreme
the
quote the words or cite
Court decisions which either
that
here
we
discover
And
case from where it stems.
these cases contain dissenting opinions, that
nearly all
the dissent, and that
is
found in
in many the citation
in a goodly number both the majority and the minority
either referred to or based themselves on the doctrine!
Faced with so much conflict and uncertainty, we should
present
reappraise the doctrine and try to discern its
limits of application.
enunciated by Oliver Wendell
The phrase was first
Holmes on March 3, 1919, in his opinion for a unanimous
court in Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, when he wrote,
the
speaking of the power of the Government to limit
"The question
freedom of expression by an individual:
in each case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
they will bring about the
clear and present danger that
to prevent.
Congress has a right
that
substantive evils
It
is
a question of proximity and degree."
This phrase has become a determinant wherever
Amendment of the Federal
of the First
the protection
The
Amendment in unqualified
claimed.
Constitution is
proCongress from making any law i.e.
terms prohibits
abridging freethe free exercise of religion,
hibiting
of peacable asdom of speech and press or the right
An "abridgment" can occur by a previous resembly.
straint on speech, as well as by the threat of subsequen
of Rights
Thus the Bill
punishment for what was said.
extended the old Blackstonian doctrine that a "freeman
has the undoubted right to lay what sentiments he has
he publishes what is improper,
before the public, but if
mischievous, and illegal, he must take the consequences

The lack of qualification did
of his own temerity."
broaden the idea of freedom of utterance in America.
But on the other hand, the right has never been an absolute one, nor has it been unconditionally protected
from prior restraint.
The operation of some e-ommon law
rules and the exercise of important Federai and State
powers in some respect and to some degree invade the
individual's right to express his thoughts at will.
Like all human activities, those protected by the First
Amendment must be weighted according to their impression and effect on relations between people, and at
times may be subordinated for the good of all.
The
rule laid down by Holmes provided a possible test for
the extent of permissible deprivation of these rights.
The setting in which the doctrine was announced
was a prosecution under the 1917 Espionage Act for
conspiracy to influence persons -subject to the Draft
Act to obstruct the draft.
Defendant had circulated
literature asking the draftees to disobey the draft.
The Act was held not violative of the First Amendment,
and sustainable under the war power, as it was time
freedom of
speech - which is
not
absolute
- could be
restrained in the interest of the National safety.
The decision could have tested on this alone, but
Holmes went further to announce the proposition that
there must be a clear danger and a present danger of
the substantive evil being brought about by the words
spoken before the Government can exercise its power to
proscribe and punish.
As this test was "not absolutely necessary to the decision of this-case (which apparently fell within the limits set by the test), we
may suppose that the remark was simply "magnificent
dictum."
Thus the question of raising this phrase to
the dignity of a test of constitutionality is left to
later cases.
Two important questions arise on a reading of
the Schenck case.
Holmes spoke of "circumstances"
in which words would become culpable.
What such circumstances could be, has been a major source of contention.
They vary in degree with each of the types
of situations to which the Schenck test has been applied.
The other problem is whether the doctrine
actually sets absolute limits either to permissible
deprivation or to permissible speech, or whether it
is only an approximate description of the areas free
from Governmental control.
A review of the major

United States Supreme Court
trine is here necessary.

cases dealing with the

doc-

The first few cases reiterating the doctrine
arose under the same law, the Espionage Act, and on
In Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 206, the
similar facts.
defendant published literature denouncing the war effort, and in Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211, the defendant
made speeches declaring himself opposed to all war, including the present one, and urged opposition to recruiting.
Holmes, speaking for the court in both cases,
of the Schenck decision,
disposed of them on the basis
A visible
change
handed down only seven days earlier.
occured by November of that year, when the opinion in
Abrams v. U.S., 40 S. Ct. 17, was announced. Here conviction was had under the same Act and on similar
applicable
The majority held the Schenck test
grounds.
in affirming the conviction.
Justices Holmes and Branview of the facts,
although they
deis dissented on their
They held that the inreasserted the Schenck doctrine.
tent
of the defendant here was to prevent interference
with the Russian revolution, thus was not necessarily
obstructive to the war in which the United States was
engaged, and consequently would not produce present
danger of the substantive evil punished by the statute.
In the Abrams dissent, Holmes developed the basis
that
for his doctrine further:
"When men have realized
faiths, they may come to
time has upset many fighting
believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
the power of the thought to get itself
test
of truth
is
accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution. "
The case of Schaeffer v. U.S., 40 S. CT. 259,
showed a clearer break with the majority of the court.
Here a conviction under the Espionage Act for publishing false reports and editorials to promote the success
Again
of the enemies of the United States was upheld.
the dissent
disagreed on the inferences from the facts.
to
though the U.S. had a right
Brandeis maintained that
punish in a proper case, under the "rule of reason" of
the Schenck case, no jury could here have found that the
publication "would obstruct recruiting" or "would promote

the success of the enemies," and thus there would be no
decided
of
the court
The same division
danger.
present
Pierce v. U.S. 40 S. Ct. 205, where distribution of pamphlets to cause insubordination and disloyalty in the
armed forces was held punishable under the Espionage
for
the
was a question
it
that
held
The majority
Act.
whether defendant's printed words would as a proxijury,
with the armed
interference
produce material
nate result
was no
there
that
maintained
But again Brandeis
forces.
the
pamphlets was only
of
as the purpose
danger,
present
to gain members for the Socialist party, and as they
to any members of the armed forces.
were not distributed
and the dissents
the court
of
both the majority
If
in
the above cases relied on the Schenck doctrine, how
The confusion
conclusions possible?
were the different
stems from the fact that the doctrine was in effect a
That in reality it was
mere dictum in the Schenck case.
not there relied on, nor in the next two cases, is evithe three
cases.
of
Holmes in
dent from the opinions
in which
circumstances
They do not discuss in detail the
the prohibited words were uttered, nor whether the words
under those circumstances created a substantial and imThe
evil
to be prevented.
of
the
mediate probability
seems to
war then in progress
the
overpowering shadow of
These
and degree."
the test
of
"proximity
have satisfied
the firing
after
were handed down shortly
decisions
the
Armistice
of
one year after
But the interval
ceased.
by
of their
position
may have produced a reexamination
an inquiry
that
and a determination
Holmes and Brandeis,
be
each case should henceforth
facts
of
into
the special
speech
of
freedom of
had to show whether the deprivation
was so vitally necessary that the case should be upheld.
to make the
hand, continued
The majority,
on the other
war,
thus of
"circumstances"
of
the state
of
existence
of the
for
the application
sense,
the
basis
in
a larger
to folstatute.
Thus though they professed
restrictive
applied
it
was not strictly
low the Schenck doctrine,
In analysing the later cases
in its literal meaning.
into
which meaning was given to it.
we must inquire
We can here pause to consider what might have
Holmes as to the scope of
of Justice
been the intention
if
we
accept the doctrine as
Certainly,
the doctrine.
actually applied in the Schenck case, it does not predeprivation.
of
permissible
limit
sent
an exclusive
of
the
act to the
proximity
case
the
actual
In that
possible result or the degree of effect on such possible

result was not looked into, and the conviction was sustained on the ground that "when a nation is at war,
many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its efforts . . . that no court
could regard them as protected by any Constitutional
right."
Thus the "clear and present danger" may not
be the exclusive
limit
to Governmental restriction
of
speech, which in time of National emergency may thus be
further restricted.
But Holmes's and B randeis's later
position in their dissents reveal that the real meaning
was the literal meaning of the phrase.
This suggests
that even though a state of war existed and the Government was constitutionally authorized to protect its
military operations, it is still a primary question of
fact whether the speech of the defendant was remote or
proximate,
or substantial
or inconsequential, in tending to produce the result
to be avoided.
Under this
interpretation,
the "clear
and present danger" rule
may have been intended
as a real
measure of protection
of
the right
of
free
speech, and as a limit
beyond
which it
could not be infringed
on by Governmental
action.
Of course, this meaning was only presented in
dissenting
opinions,
and whether the court
would make
it its own was left to later cases.
The preceding cases have dealt only with Federal
statutes
and the question
of
their
applicability
to
the defendant.
The next case before the high court
involving the doctrine, Gilbert v. Minnesota, 41 S. Ct.
125, indicated an extension of the test into two new
areas, the acts of states and defenses to status per
se.
Here a state status punishing the uttering of
words in a public meeting to discourage enlistments
in the armed forces and a conviction under it were
upheld.
Though the Schenck case was cited, the decision was on the basis of the state's police power to
preserve the peace and its interest in a national war.
Brandeis,
dissenting,
denied
that
the police
power of
the state, exercised in peace and war, could curb
freedom of speech to an extent only reserved to Congress in time of war, the war power justifying the
restriction in averting present danger in war time.
He considered
the guaranties
of
the First
Amendment
to be privileges
of
national
citizenship,
which could
not
be abridged
by the states.
But Holmes concurred
in
the result.
His reason for
this
may be found by
pointing to his opinion in Fox v. Washington, 236
U.S.
273,
(1915),
upholding
a state
statute
outlawing

the willful publishing of any incitement to the commission of any crime.
He held that act to be a justifiable
deprivation of liberty consistent with due process.
The
state here had reasonably drawn the line of permissible
behavior short of the encouragement of manifest disrespect for law, i.e. overt breaches and technically criminal acts.
Thus Holmes insisted on a narrow construction of the statute, and as such upheld it.
But here
only the 14th Amendment was the basis for
objection,
and
at that time the positive prohibitions of the First
Amendment were not thought to be implied in the Due Process Clause of the 14th.
Not until the Gitlow case, 45
S. Ct. 625, was the Bill of Rights interpreted as a measure of "due process". and thus as an inhibition on state
action.
Gitlow v. New York also upheld a state law prohibiting certain utterances entirely.
Here the New York
Criminal Anarchy Act was sustained on the state's right
to preserve itself, unqualifiedly held to be superior
to freedom of speech.
The majority distinguished the
Schenck case by differentiating statutes proscribing
speech per se and statutes prohibiting certain acts
tending to bring about a substantive evil.
They said
the Schenck doctrine was intended to apply only in the
second type of cases, where the "acts" consist of speech.
There an original showing must be made in each case that
the speech is in fact dangerous, while in the former
type the tendency to produce the evil is immaterial. The
only showing here would be that the words actually fall
within the forbidden area of speech.- If so, they were
punishable, as long as the state had the power to pass
such a statute.
This distinction was vigorously attacked by Holmes and Brandeis as fatuous and unwarranted
by the positive language of the First Amendment, which
the majority had implied to be applicable in determining
the scope of the Due Process Clause.
The "danger" test
should be an original question in each case where utterances are held culpable.
But Holmes' misapprehension in
his dissent was his expressed assumption that the law
had been settled on that point, when in fact the majority of the court, as pointed out above, refused to interpret his doctrine at face value.
His view of the test
was not adopted by the court until 1937.
No further light was shed on the doctrine by
Whitney v. California, 47 S. Ct. 641, where the court
held the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act well within

the decision of the Gitlow case.
Holmes and Brandeis
reiterated that though a statute may be constitutional
per se, it may still be challenged as invalidly applied,
But they concurred in the result, because they found
evidence of a conspiracy, and the defendant did not
claim invalidity of application under the circumstances.
The Schenck case was next cited in Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, for the proposition that the imposition
of
previous
restraint
on speech was not absolutely
forbidden, but is allowable in exceptional cases, such as
in war time.
However, the test was not a feature of
that case, which overthrew a statute prohibiting scandalous publications on the ground that its necessary
effect was to impose censorship on criticism of public
officers.
The case held freedom of the press to be
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.
If
the
doctrine
was ever to become a test
of
constitutionality, its limits and operation could not
be discerned until a conviction was actually held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on those grounds.
This occurred in Herndon v. Lowry, 57 S. Ct. 738,
own
his
finally
came into
prophet
(1937),
where the
two years
after
his
death.
Though by a narrow margin
of
one vote,
the
court
held
the Georgia Anti-Insurrection
Statute
(penalizing
any attempt
by persuato join
in
any comor otherwise
to induce others
sion
bined
resistance to lawful authority of the state)
inapplicable to a case where the defendant solicited
memberships for the Communist Party.
Mr. Justice
Roberts here applied the Schenck test in its literal
meaning, saying that there is no such proximity between an insurrection
and the
mere procurement of
members to a party,
some of
the
tenets
of
which may
be"lawful,
others,
as may be assumed, unlawful" by
"ultimate
resort
to violence
at
some indefinite
future
time."
The decision
then also
held
the statute
invalid
on its
face
for
furnishing
too indefinite
a
standard
for
guilt.
This opinion
which may now be
Schenck doctrine
requirements
for
effecting
a right
For example,
statute
fering,
proximately
and well defined

is
notable
for
two propositions,
considered
corollaries
of the
as applied
here.
It
indicated
some
the
constitutionality
of
a statute
guaranteed
by the First
Amendment.
to curb speech willfully
interand substantially,
with a vital
governmental activity,
or speech

having a "dangerous tendency" to subvert the government,
Such statutes had to describe and dehave been upheld.
fine the proscribed utterance'carefully and adequately
and require a narrow intent directed against the vital
Such intent may be inferred
object to be protected.
from time, place, and circumstances.
The second proposition was the holding that "the
power of the state to abridge freedom of speech and of
assembly is the exception rather than the rule.
The
limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate
relation to the safety of the state."
This pronouncement is important, as it limits the rule which had been
followed up to the time of the Gitlow and Whitney cases.
"Every preThe opinion in the former case declared:
sumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of
the statute."
This doctrine is the usual presumption
in deciding whether a statute is a reasonable means of
achieving its lawful purpose, upon an attack under the
Due Process Clause.
But it was only logical that the
court should adopt this exception to the presumption,
when it required more than mere "reasonableness" in
upholding statutes affecting freedom of speech.
To the
effect that this was in consonance with Holmes' view
and to show the theoretical basis for the new rule, a
passage of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 S. Ct., 448, is enlightening:
"The ideas now governing the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech derive essentially from the opinions of
Mr. Justice Holmes. The philosophy of his opinions on
that subject arose from a deep awareness of the extent
to which sociological conclusions are conditioned on time
and circumstances.
Because of this awareness, Mr. Justice
Holmes seldom felt justified in opposing his own opinion
to economic views which the legislature embodied in law.
But since he also realized that the progress of civilization is to a considerable extent the displacement of
error which once held sway as official truths by beliefs
which in turn have yielded to other beliefs, for him the
right to search for truth was of a different order than
some transient economic dogma.
And without freedom of
expression, thought becomes checked and atrophied. Therefore, in considering what interests are so fundamental
as to be enshrined in the Due Process Clause, those
liberties of the individual which.history has attested
as the indispensable condition of an open as against a
closed.society come to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which

derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Holmes was far more ready to find legislative invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the
debatable area of economics."
With the Lowry case then, the "clear and present
danger" doctrine had "arrived" as the rule of the Supreme Court.
Its
application
was,
according
to its
literal meaning rather than its early application.
But
the majority so holding was narrow, and the issue of its
application was not laid at rest.
In fact, the court
has,
since
1937,
split
more bitterly
than before.
In
the
cases
following,
we shall
not
concern ourselves
so
much with the types of
cases
to which the rule
is
relevant
(i.e.
what would actually
constitute
a "substantive evil) ",
but rather, how far the Court has gone in
applying the rule.
Has it been extended or restricted?
The suggestion in the Lowry case as to narrowness
in drafting and construction of statutes affecting
freedom or speech was followed-in Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, and Carlson v. California, 60 S. Ct. 746,
in which the Schenck doctrine was applied in cases of
industrial disputes.
The decisions declared a statute
prohibiting
going near
a place
of
business
to induce
others not to deal with such business, and a statute
prohibiting the carrying of signes in picketing, unconrestriction
of
the liberas an unwarranted
stitutional
ty of discussion of public issues.
The statutes were
face,
too sweeping in
scope,
and thus
void
on their
"under circumstances presenting no clear and present
danger of substantive evil within the allowable area
of state control."
Thus where a statute is so drawn as
to cover a multitude of situations which would fall
outside the "clear and present danger" area, the court
now committed itself to the invalidation of the entire
statute.
But what would the
holding
be as to the validity
of
such a statute,
where the
facts
of the
case before the court would satisfy the "clear and present
danger" test?
On this point, a clue was given in Milk Wagon
drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.-, 61 S. Ct.
552, in which an injunction of picketing was upheld
in its entirety, where the strike was set against a
Here the right to picket as
background of violence.
a right of free speech was in effect limited to peaceBut the majority did not mention the
ful picketing.

Schenck test,
and the minority disagreed in its interpretation of the facts, finding no clear and present
danger of continued violence to warrant an entire pros.cription of picketing as such.
Thus, though limiting
the effect of the Thornhill case as to picketing, this
case does not clarify further the extent of the Schenck
doctrine.

The cases of Pennekamp v.

Florida, 66 S.

Ct.

1029,

and Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. 1249, must be considered
together with Bridges v. California, 62 S. Ct. 190.
They were all contempt citations issued by state courts
for publishing comments on cases then pending in court.
Defendants were a labor leader, who stated in a telegram that a certain decision would result in a strike,
and newspaper publishers, who printed editorials imputing partisanship to the judge, calling for high sentences for convicted defendants, belittling the judge,
and commenting unfavorably on the judge's disposition
of cases.
The Bridges case first introduced the Schenck
test into this type of case, displacing the earlier rule
that a "reasonable tendency" must be shown that the
words used would interfere with the orderly administration of justice.
Mr. Justice Black spoke of the Schenck
test as a rule affording "practical guidance."
Then, by
this test, the words published were held to be not a
substantial threat to administration of justice by intimidation of the judge, upon the preconception- that a
"a lack of firmness, wisdom or honor" must not be imputed to the judge.
But what circumstances would actually present a clear and present danger to warrant
contempt for comment made outside the courtroom was not
indicated, except that the opinion in the Craig case
called for an appraisal of the words in the setting of
the news articles both preceding and following it and
in the light of community environment prevailing at the
time.
But it stated that "the law of contempt is not
made for the protection of judges sensitive to winds of
public opinion," and thus in effect creates a deterrent,
if not a material restriction, to the use of the contempt power.
The conflict
in
the court
as to the
Schenck test generally is indicated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's attack on its use here, in his dissent
in the Craig case:
"The opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes
contain not the remotest hint that the Due Process
Clause withdrew from the states the power to base a
finding of contempt on publication aimed at a particular outcome of a matter awaiting adjudication . . ..

(thus the doctrine
would become) merely a phrase
for
covering up a novel, iron constitutional doctrine."
Strictly, however, the difference in opinion rests on
divergent views of the facts, although a deeper conflict
as to the limits
of
the doctrine
is
expressed,
which will be dealt with.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 62 S. Ct. 766, though
not directly citing the Schenck doctrine, serves to illustrate,
in
the words of
Mr.
Justice
Murphy,
that
allowing the broadest scope to the First Amendment, "there
are certain
well-defined
and narrowly limited
classes
of
speech,
the prevention
and punishment of
which has never
been thought to raise
any constitutional
problem."
Included here are lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and
"insulting"
or "fighting"
words - those which by mere
utterance
inflict
injury
or tend to incite
an immediate
breach of
the peace.
Their
social
value is
so slight
as
a step
to truth
as to be outweighed by the value
of
order and morality.
These types of restrictions, it may
be noted, are not inconsistent with the Schenck doctrine
nor do they extend its
limits
of
permissible
proscription of speech.
These classes of speech have al-ways
been considered such immediate inroads on elementary interests
of decency, morality,
and peacefulness
to be subject
to prohibition.
Put there
is
emphasis on "narrowness"
of these
classes
of
speech,
and the necessity
for
drafting
the
statute
accordingly.
In
line
with the Court's
application
of
the Schenck
doctrine since the Lowry case, it restated the requirements for conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 in
the decision
of
Hartzel
v.
U.S., 64 S. Ct.
1233.
It applied
a subjective
test
and an objective
test:
1)
a narrow specific
intent,
which is
provable
from the words
used and the circumstances;
2)
activities
creating
a
clear
and present
danger of
bringing
about the evil.
Then
the court inquired into the circumstances of this particu
lar
case,
deciding
that
there
was a reasonable
doubt of
the defendant's specific intent to cause insubordination
in
the armed forces.
However,
the dissent
found such
criminal
intent.
The literal application of the Schenck doctrine was
adhered to in Thomas v. Collins, 65 S. Ct. 315, where a
State law requiring registration of persons soliciting
members for labor unions was held inapplicable.
A labor
leader here made a speech, in which he extended a general

invitation
to join
and also a specific
invitation
to
one person.
Though the statute
Was defended as a legitimate licensing requirement of a profession, the court
found that under the Schenck test that defense could
not be applied here.
Mr. Justice
Rutledge held that lawful assemblies, involving no grave and immediate danger,
are not instruments of harm, thus requiring no previous
identification of speakers.
This is in accord with
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, holding that the right
of assembly cannot itself
be made a crime.
That the "clear and present danger" test
is
applicable to protect freedom of religion was held in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 03 S. Ct.
1178, where a compulsory flag salute for school children,
carrying penalties
for disobedience, was overturned as
violative
of the 14th Amendment.
Mr. Justice
Murphy here
said that, where the flag salute
is
regarded as contrary
to a religious obligation, it is a restriction on religious freedom, which includes "the right to speak and to
refrain
from speaking.-"
Mr. Justice
Jackson reiterated
the doctrine:
"Freedom of speech and religion
may not
be infringed upon such slender grounds" (i.e.
simply a
"rational basis" for regulation, which usually satisfies
due process).
"They are susceptible to restriction
only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the state may lawfully protect."
Thus the literal basis
of the Schenck doctrine was affirmed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter again dissented strongly on theory, but disagreed
on the merits, because he could not see any suppression
of or curb on any belief.
On the ground of the Barnette
case,
the court held a conviction for teaching or dissemination of literature "reasonably tending to create
an attitude
of stubborn refusal
to salute,
honor, or
respect the national and state
flags" void.
Thus the
state law punishing the teaching of disloyalty to the
national and state governments was inapplicable. Taylor
v. Mississippi, 63 S. Ct. 1200.
The converse right to propagate one's religious
beliefs was held in Martin v. City of Struthers, 63 S.
Ct. 862, to have a higher dignity than municipal or
personal convenience.
Here an ordinance completely
prohibited distribution of handbills to residences. As
the First
Amendment has been held to include the right
to circulate literature (Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444), an absolute prohibition
of such circulation
to
residences ill a city was held to transgress the permis-

sible
bounds of
"regulation"
of
such circulation
in
the
interest of public order.
This ruling
was carried
further in Marsh v. Alabama, 66 S. Ct. 276, to apply to a
company town, where religious preaching had been forbidden.
Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in both cases, thought
the restriction to be merely a permissible regulation under the police power, not materially invading the area of
free speech.
Whether this rule would be carried to the
extent that one may now remain on private property against
the will
of
the owner,
so long as the only objection
to his remaining there is his right to spread his religious views, (as feared by Reed) is doubtful.
Although
both majority and dissent are phrased in general terms,
there may in fact have been some degree of dedication to
public use in the streets of a company town, and thus the
application of the case could be limited to public or
quasi-public places.
It is certainly not applicable to a
private
dwelling.
These cases concerned the
validity
of
the application
of a law in a particular case.
Taking the Schenck
test as a point of departure, the Court has invalidated
statutes
going so clearly
beyond the bounds of
any clear
and present danger of substantive evil that their necessary operation would involve prior restraints on speech
in practice, even though the Court later could hold the
statute inapplicable to a particular situation.
Such a
clear case was Thornhill v. Alabama.
But the last two
cases considered were not so clear, and in Kovacs v.
Cooper-, 69 S.
Ct. 448,
a boundary line
was approached and crossed.
The schism is indicated by the fact that
the division in the Court was five to four, that five
opinions were written, and that no more than three Justices joined in any one opinion.
Here a conviction under
a municipal ordinan.ce prohibiting
the use of
sound trucks
or other instruments "making loud and raucous noises" was
upheld, as a re-asonable exercise of police power.
The
use of such devices was thought to involve limitation on
speech only incidentally.
Mr. Justice Reed said that
such exercise of free speech may be "controlled" in the
interest of public order, and that even an absolute prohibition in a limited area (city) was proper control. Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, maintained that "there is no
more reason for
wholly prohibiting
one useful
instrument
of
communication than another,"
although
the use of such
instruments could be reasonably controlled.
The minority
protested
that
the conviction
was not for making "noises"
but for operating a sound truck, without any finding as t

"noises", and thus.completely inhibited one means of expressing opinion.
This opinion came at the heels of Saia
v. New York, 68 S. Ct. 1148, where a prohibition of sound
trucks except with a permit of the police chief was invalidated as a previous restraint on speech!
The lint drawn, where validity of statutes per se
is in issue, is thus much more vaccilating than where the
applicability of statutes to particular cases is to be
decided.
The question posed after our consideration of
the Lowry case received one possible answer in Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 S. Ct. 894.
The defendant had made an
inflammatory speech in a situation where the tension between his listeners and an unfriendly crowd had reached
proportions of a riot.
He was convicted of disorderly
conduct, which an ordinance defined as "making, aiding
a breach of the peace

.

. .

"

Breach

of the peace

was

de-

fined in the court's charge as behavior which "stirs the
public to anger, invites disputes, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.-"
Mr. Justice
Douglas held that the acceptance of this definition by the
state Supreme Court made it part of the ordinance.
He
said the exercise of free speech in a free society may
legitimately have the results of the first three parts of
the definition, and an inhibition of such exercise makes
the ordinance void in part.
As the charge to the jury
did not permit severance of the void parts from the valid
parts, it would be impossible to determine on which of
them the general verdict rested.
In such a manner the
ordinance could not be applied to the defendant.
The case
was decided by a narrow margin.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in
a strong dissent, declared:
"Rioting is a substantive
evil

.

.

.

The evidence proves

beyond dispute

that

danger

3f rioting and violence in response to this speech was
clear, present, and immediate."
As the majority did not
rule on the merits, we have here a case where a statute
as construed was held to be an inhibition of free speech
in
its
application even though the facts
of the case presumably :atisfied the "clear and present danger" test.
The technical correctness of the majority may be assumed.
This was a matter of statutory construction and of the
application of the construed provision to the case. Thus
this decision does not give a strong answer to our previous question.
What would be the result if the position
taken here would be carried forward to a case in which a
statute
were attacked on its
face for possible unconstitutional application in an obvious case of clear and present danger?
Such an application would create the anomaly

of a defendant going free, though guilty under an applicable part of a statute and on the Constitutional test,
merely because of the possibility of another, unconstitutional interpretation of the statute being applied in
a different case, even though the Constitutional question
Of course, the
could still be raised in such other case!
the
Court not overshould
contrary question then is, why
such a
whenever
rule a statute it finds unconstitutional
statute is presented to it for justification of a convicPerhaps a remedy can be found in a policy against
tion?
excessive technicality in applying a test of constituof
the case.
apart
from the facts
tionality
However, it is not our purpose to suggest possible
future tendencies, but only to attempt an assessment of
It is evident
the present standing of the doctrine.
that in the 30 years "clear and present danger" has been
the ostensible rule of the Court, and the 12 years it
has been the real rule, the Court has hardly been able
it
raises.
Thus it is of
the issues
to agree on any of
As to what "circumlittle use to make generalizations.
stances" would justify inroads on freedom of speech, it
could be said that where the "substantive evil" is less
than the national safety or the existence of our form
of government, the Court is far less ready to uphold a
restriction on speech even when the danger of bringing
immenent.
This is indicated in the
about such evil! is
cases involving contempt of Court, labor disputes, and
There the freedom of speech, press,
religious liberty.
and religion are held of much higher order than the inWhere a threat to
terests which interfere with them.
existence of the government itself is concerned, hardly
any cases since the period before the Lowry case have
must prethe situation
peril
with what degree of
dealt
Thus whether
sent to authorize restriction of speech.
the attitude of the Court in the earlier decisions will
govern, or a modification thereof, is an open question.
Where the constitutionality of statutes per se is involvIt will look
ed, the tendency of the Court is similar.
to the importance of the interest protected, and the deIt is
gree of danger required will vary accordingly.
broadhas
been
the
doctrine
this
phase
that
in
possible
ened, as suggested in the Terminiello case, for when a
statute is cut down, any possible constitutional parts
severability.
want of
of
it
for
with the rest
often
fall

still

Thus we
in
process

see

the limits
that
of
formulation.

of
To

the doctrine
are
date a summation

of the decisions have shown a tendency to set up a posibarrier
against most encroachments on the liberties
tive
But the issues are far
protected by the First Amendment.
As we must conclude by finding disfrom being settled.
union, not only on the Court's application of the doctrine to facts, but also on a possible basic approach,
no clearer conception of this conflict can be conveyed
Mr.
of these views.
than by quoting the protagonists
Justice Frankfurter in the Meadowmoor Dairies case:
"Freedom of speech . . . cannot be too often invoked as
basic to our scheme of society. But these liberties will
not be advanced or even maintained by denying to the
states with all their resources, including the instrumenof their
courts, the power to deal with coercion
tality
Mr. Justice Black in the
due to extensive violence."
same case:
"I view the guaranties of the First Amendment
as the foundation upon -which our governmental structure
rests, and without which it could not continue to endure
as

conceived

.

and planned

.

.

the

states

should

be left

wholly free to govern within the ambit of their powers
. But this Court has long since committed itself to
the doctrine that a state cannot, through any agency,
or partially whittle away the
either wholly remove
Amendindividual freedoms guaranteed by the First
vital
The divergent conclusions are indicated by the
ment.-"
.following quotations.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the
did not enunciate) a formal
"(Holmes
Barnette case;
restriction on free speech,
there
could
be
no
rule that
nor compulsion where conscience balks, unless imminent
danger would thereby be wrought to our institutions and
our Government."
Mr. Justice Black in Bridges v. California:

"What emerges

.

.

.

is

a

working principle

that

the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances
do not) mark
(The cases applying it
can be punished.
boundaries of protected
the furthermost constitutional
expression, nor do we here."

